Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Bob Hale and Seneca the Younger

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109 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom does not lie in books, and unread people can also become wise [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca]
Wise people escape necessity by willing it [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca]
What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
That something is a necessary condition of something else doesn't mean it caused it [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca]
Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale]
With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale]
Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale]
Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale]
If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale]
Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale]
The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale]
Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale]
It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale]
Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale]
Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale]
If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale]
Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Trouble in life comes from copying other people, which is following convention instead of reason [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We know death, which is like before birth; ceasing to be and never beginning are the same [Seneca]
Living is nothing wonderful; what matters is to die well [Seneca]
It is as silly to lament ceasing to be as to lament not having lived in the remote past [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Is anything sweeter than valuing yourself more when you find you are loved? [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness does not produce happiness; to live for yourself, live for others [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
To be always happy is to lack knowledge of one half of nature [Seneca]
A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Life is like a play - it is the quality that matters, not the length [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
We are scared of death - except when we are immersed in pleasure! [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The whole point of pleasure-seeking is novelty, and abandoning established ways [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Nature doesn't give us virtue; we must unremittingly pursue it, as a training and an art [Seneca]
Living contrary to nature is like rowing against the stream [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
True greatness is never allowing events to disturb you [Seneca]
Character is ruined by not looking back over our pasts, since the future rests on the past [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca]
Every night I critically review how I have behaved during the day [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It's no good winning lots of fights, if you are then conquered by your own temper [Seneca]
Anger is a vice which afflicts good men as well as bad [Seneca]
Excessive curiosity is a form of intemperance [Seneca]
Anger is an extreme vice, threatening sanity, and gripping whole states [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Nothing bad can happen to a good man [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca]
If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca]
There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
To govern used to mean to serve, not to rule; rulers did not test their powers over those who bestowed it [Seneca]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Both teachers and pupils should aim at one thing - the improvement of the pupil [Seneca]
One joy of learning is making teaching possible [Seneca]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide may be appropriate even when it is not urgent, if there are few reasons against it [Seneca]
If we control our own death, no one has power over us [Seneca]
Sometimes we have a duty not to commit suicide, for those we love [Seneca]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The ocean changes in volume in proportion to the attraction of the moon [Seneca]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Does time exist on its own? Did anything precede it? Did it pre-exist the cosmos? [Seneca]