117 ideas
19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
8558 | One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker] |
8559 | Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker] |
10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
8594 | People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared [Shoemaker] |
19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
10632 | The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright] |
19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
8596 | Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker] |
8597 | We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker] |
19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
15092 | Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker] |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
8543 | Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker] |
8551 | Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker] |
8557 | To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker] |
15761 | We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker] |
15756 | Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker] |
15758 | Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker] |
8547 | One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker] |
8549 | Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker] |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
12678 | Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis] |
8545 | A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker] |
15757 | 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker] |
15759 | The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker] |
15760 | Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker] |
15762 | Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker] |
8552 | If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker] |
4040 | The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker] |
15765 | Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker] |
14534 | Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum] |
8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
9485 | Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird] |
10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
8550 | Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker] |
10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
8555 | There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker] |
10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
8554 | Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker] |
12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
15764 | 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker] |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
8593 | Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal [Shoemaker] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
8556 | Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker] |
5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
1389 | If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker] |
1390 | Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG] |
19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
8542 | If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker] |
8598 | If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause [Shoemaker] |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
8560 | If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
15763 | If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker] |
8561 | If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker] |
8553 | It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker] |
4226 | If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe] |
8595 | If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker] |