67 ideas
11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
15477 | Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB] |
11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
15471 | Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB] |
11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
15484 | A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB] |
15478 | Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB] |
15483 | Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB] |
11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
15480 | Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB] |
15489 | A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB] |
11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
15487 | If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB] |
11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
15479 | Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB] |
15488 | Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB] |
15469 | Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB] |
11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
15466 | 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB] |
15467 | Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB] |
11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
15476 | Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB] |
15465 | Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB] |
11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
15481 | I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB] |
15474 | Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB] |
11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
15486 | Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB] |
15475 | The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB] |
11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
15492 | Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB] |
11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
15495 | Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB] |
11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
15493 | Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB] |
11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
15485 | Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB] |
15491 | Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB] |
15468 | Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB] |
11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
15470 | Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB] |
11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |
15482 | We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB] |