Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, C.D. Broad and J.L. Mackie

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20 ideas

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad]
A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett]
We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [Mackie, by PG]
The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [Mackie, by PG]