36 ideas
10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
12900 | How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach] |
12901 | If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach] |
12902 | Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
9758 | To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard] |
9757 | A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard] |
10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |
9759 | Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard] |
18678 | Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi] |
18225 | If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard] |
18228 | An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard] |
9760 | Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard] |
18224 | Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard] |
9761 | Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard] |
18233 | Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard] |
18226 | For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard] |