35 ideas
20962 | Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie] |
15670 | The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
15665 | We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
20573 | Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala] |
12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
20961 | What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie] |
12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
15667 | To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas] |
15668 | Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
15666 | To understand language is to know how to use it to reach shared understandings [Habermas] |
9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
15677 | Moral right is linked to validity and truth, so morality is a matter of knowledge, not an expression of values [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
15672 | Actions norms are only valid if everyone possibly affected is involved in the discourse [Habermas] |
15671 | Move from individual willing of a general law, to willing norms agreed with other people [Habermas] |
15669 | People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
23416 | Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka] |