16 ideas
| 19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
| 19513 | A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose] |
| 19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
| 19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
| 19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
| 19514 | Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose] |
| 19515 | We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose] |
| 19510 | In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose] |
| 19516 | Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose] |
| 19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
| 19511 | If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose] |
| 19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
| 19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
| 12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
| 12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |