26 ideas
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
9758 | To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard] |
9757 | A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard] |
9759 | Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
18678 | Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi] |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
18225 | If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard] |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
18228 | An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard] |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
9760 | Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard] |
18224 | Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard] |
9761 | Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard] |
18233 | Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard] |
18226 | For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard] |