28 ideas
14001 | People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian] |
13991 | Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian] |
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
14002 | Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
14000 | 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
13990 | Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian] |
13992 | Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian] |
13994 | Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian] |
13995 | Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian] |
13996 | Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian] |
13997 | Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian] |
13993 | Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian] |
13998 | Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian] |
13999 | People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian] |