Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Francesco Orsi and Peter Abelard

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10397 Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
10396 If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
10395 Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
15384 Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
8481 The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
15385 Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
15383 Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
10398 Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P]