Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Franois Recanati and Ludwig Feuerbach

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86 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Only that which can be an object of religion is an object of philosophy [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' abstraction from sensation and matter [Feuerbach]
Empiricism is right about ideas, but forgets man himself as one of our objects [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The laws of reality are also the laws of thought [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Absolute thought remains in another world from being [Feuerbach]
Being is what is undetermined, and hence indistinguishable [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being posits essence, and my essence is my being [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
Particularity belongs to being, whereas generality belongs to thought [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
The only true being is of the senses, perception, feeling and love [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati]
Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati]
How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati]
Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati]
Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati]
Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati]
Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati]
An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati]
Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati]
The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati]
A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati]
There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati]
Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati]
A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati]
Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati]
The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The new philosophy thinks of the concrete in a concrete (not a abstract) manner [Feuerbach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati]
Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati]
We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati]
Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati]
Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati]
Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati]
A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati]
A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati]
Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati]
Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati]
Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati]
Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Egoism is the only evil, love the only good; genuine love produces all the other virtues [Feuerbach]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is not a particular being, like animals, but a universal being [Feuerbach]
The essence of man is in community, but with distinct individuals [Feuerbach]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Consciousness is said to distinguish man from animals - consciousness of his own species [Feuerbach]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God's existence cannot be separated from essence and concept, which can only be thought as existing [Feuerbach]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The nature of God is an expression of human nature [Feuerbach]
If God is only an object for man, then only the essence of man is revealed in God [Feuerbach]
God is what man would like to be [Feuerbach]
God is for us a mere empty idea, which we fill with our own ego and essence [Feuerbach]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Catholicism concerns God in himself, Protestantism what God is for man [Feuerbach]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the consciousness of the infinite [Feuerbach]
Absolute idealism is the realized divine mind of Leibnizian theism [Feuerbach]
Today's atheism will tomorrow become a religion [Feuerbach]