34 ideas
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
| 16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
| 16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
| 16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
| 14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
| 16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
| 19284 | Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn] |
| 14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 14629 | If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn] |
| 14529 | If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
| 6451 | Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn] |
| 7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
| 12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
| 7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
| 2866 | A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn] |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
| 16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
| 12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
| 23996 | Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn] |
| 11911 | Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn] |
| 2864 | The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn] |
| 2865 | Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn] |
| 23223 | The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn] |