104 ideas
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
3137 | Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars [Rey] |
3143 | Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic [Rey] |
3145 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds [Rey] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
20298 | The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience [Rey] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
3172 | Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge [Rey] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
3166 | Animal learning is separate from their behaviour [Rey] |
8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
3232 | Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned [Rey] |
3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey] |
3136 | The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey] |
3141 | Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey] |
3148 | Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach [Rey] |
3164 | Intentional explanations are always circular [Rey] |
3138 | Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia [Rey] |
3142 | Why qualia, and why this particular quale? [Rey] |
3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
3229 | If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion [Rey] |
3223 | Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality [Rey] |
3162 | Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives [Rey] |
3163 | Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious [Rey] |
3196 | Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will [Rey] |
3195 | If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will' [Rey] |
3165 | Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological [Rey] |
3180 | Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group [Rey] |
3167 | Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment [Rey] |
3173 | How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? [Rey] |
3179 | Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind [Rey] |
3186 | If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey] |
3127 | Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey] |
3188 | Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes [Rey] |
3216 | Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey] |
3220 | Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey] |
3206 | One computer program could either play chess or fight a war [Rey] |
3140 | If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it [Rey] |
3134 | Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain [Rey] |
3199 | Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes [Rey] |
3201 | Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation' [Rey] |
3202 | Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well [Rey] |
3200 | Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism [Rey] |
3150 | Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? [Rey] |
3129 | Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance [Rey] |
3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
3174 | Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli [Rey] |
3171 | Children speak 90% good grammar [Rey] |
3170 | We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey] |
3213 | Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey] |
3215 | Images can't replace computation, as they need it [Rey] |
3194 | CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason [Rey] |
3147 | Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images [Rey] |
3175 | Animals map things over time as well as over space [Rey] |
3207 | Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey] |
3176 | Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one [Rey] |
3181 | A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey] |
3204 | The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" [Rey] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
3205 | Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts [Rey] |
20300 | Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey] |
3209 | Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey] |
3210 | If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey] |
3149 | Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey] |
20294 | 'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity [Rey] |
20293 | Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed [Rey] |
20297 | Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable [Rey] |
20301 | The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used [Rey] |
20302 | An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical) [Rey] |
20303 | Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity [Rey] |
20299 | If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey] |
3169 | A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then' [Rey] |
3221 | Our desires become important when we have desires about desires [Rey] |