136 ideas
3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
22355 | In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B] |
12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
23283 | Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B] |
19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
8800 | If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
4243 | Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B] |
4244 | It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B] |
6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
17060 | Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Harman, by Smart] |
12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
3238 | 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B] |
3239 | You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B] |
3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
7946 | The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C] |
2176 | There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B] |
2181 | It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B] |
3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
24008 | Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B] |
24009 | Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B] |
6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
4317 | We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham] |
9284 | Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B] |
2174 | Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B] |
22455 | Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B] |
4114 | Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B] |
22453 | Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot] |
22454 | We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot] |
22450 | If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot] |
2178 | In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B] |
20168 | Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B] |
20167 | Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B] |
4128 | Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B] |
4366 | We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse] |
4132 | The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B] |
24007 | Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B] |
4134 | The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B] |
4135 | Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B] |
22410 | Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B] |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
22408 | Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B] |
22411 | For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B] |
4120 | It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B] |
5122 | Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman] |
23282 | If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B] |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
4252 | Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B] |
4116 | A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B] |
2169 | Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B] |
4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
24010 | An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B] |
23279 | It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B] |
23280 | Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B] |
5123 | Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman] |
5124 | If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman] |
5125 | Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman] |
3236 | Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B] |
4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
4110 | Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B] |
4250 | The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B] |
4249 | "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B] |
4248 | Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B] |
2172 | The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B] |
4121 | Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B] |
22409 | We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B] |
4122 | If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B] |
2180 | If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B] |
24012 | Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B] |
2179 | If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B] |
22407 | Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B] |
23278 | For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B] |
4124 | Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B] |
4245 | Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B] |
4246 | Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B] |
3233 | Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B] |
3234 | Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B] |
3235 | It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B] |
4247 | It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B] |
4131 | Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B] |
4133 | Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B] |
2175 | There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B] |