Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Henry Sidgwick and Michael Tooley

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16 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley]
Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]
Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley]
The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]