Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, J Pollock / J Cruz and Gilles Deleuze

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45 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
Nomads are the basis of history, and yet almost unknowable [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze]
Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
There is no being beyond becoming [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
Before Being there is politics [Deleuze]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
We don't want another new set of categories; we want a variety of flexible categories [Deleuze, by May]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz]
To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
We are currently extending capitalism to the whole of society [Deleuze]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
The State requires self-preservation, but the war-machine desires destruction [Deleuze]