Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, James Pryor and Peter Forrest

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9 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17962 The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15432 Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8845 An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8842 The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8843 Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
8844 Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
8846 Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
8847 Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]