Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, James Robert Brown and Rod Girle

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49 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions should be replaceable by primitives, and should not be creative [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle]
There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle]
S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle]
Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle]
Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Set theory says that natural numbers are an actual infinity (to accommodate their powerset) [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory assumed that there is a set for every condition [Brown,JR]
Nowadays conditions are only defined on existing sets [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The 'iterative' view says sets start with the empty set and build up [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
A flock of birds is not a set, because a set cannot go anywhere [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
If a proposition is false, then its negation is true [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 5. Tableau Proof
If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Axioms are either self-evident, or stipulations, or fallible attempts [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox finds a contradiction in the naming of huge numbers [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is the only place where we are sure we are right [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
'There are two apples' can be expressed logically, with no mention of numbers [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / n. Pi
π is a 'transcendental' number, because it is not the solution of an equation [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Mathematics represents the world through structurally similar models. [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
There is no limit to how many ways something can be proved in mathematics [Brown,JR]
Computers played an essential role in proving the four-colour theorem of maps [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Set theory may represent all of mathematics, without actually being mathematics [Brown,JR]
When graphs are defined set-theoretically, that won't cover unlabelled graphs [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
To see a structure in something, we must already have the idea of the structure [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Sets seem basic to mathematics, but they don't suit structuralism [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
The irrationality of root-2 was achieved by intellect, not experience [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR]
Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Empiricists base numbers on objects, Platonists base them on properties [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Does some mathematics depend entirely on notation? [Brown,JR]
For nomalists there are no numbers, only numerals [Brown,JR]
The most brilliant formalist was Hilbert [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
There are no constructions for many highly desirable results in mathematics [Brown,JR]
Constructivists say p has no value, if the value depends on Goldbach's Conjecture [Brown,JR]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
David's 'Napoleon' is about something concrete and something abstract [Brown,JR]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
'Abstract' nowadays means outside space and time, not concrete, not physical [Brown,JR]
The older sense of 'abstract' is where 'redness' or 'group' is abstracted from particulars [Brown,JR]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
A term can have not only a sense and a reference, but also a 'computational role' [Brown,JR]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Given atomism at one end, and a finite universe at the other, there are no physical infinities [Brown,JR]