Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Jeremy Bentham and Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

26 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16556 Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16562 We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16563 The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
16555 Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
16561 We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5901 Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
5934 Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham]
5271 Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
3777 Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
3554 Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham]
3781 The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
20977 Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
3778 The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
21003 Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
20280 Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
3779 Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16558 Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
3780 We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham]