Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Jody Azzouni and Keith T. Maslin

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin]
Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni]