Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, John Duns Scotus and Friend/Kimpton-Nye

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40 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG]
Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]