Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Jonathan Bennett and George Engelbretsen

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25 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18915 If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
18919 There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
18913 Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
18907 Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
18912 Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18922 Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
18905 Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18908 Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18917 Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
8439 Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
8440 Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8978 Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18916 Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
18921 Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
18918 Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
18920 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
18906 Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8441 Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
8436 Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8435 Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10364 Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8437 The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
8438 A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
8592 Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker]