19 ideas
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
17818 | How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau] |
17822 | Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau] |
17817 | Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau] |
17815 | We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau] |
17821 | You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau] |
14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |