27 ideas
8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
5451 | Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner] |
8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |