13 ideas
8526 | We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly] |
8527 | More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly] |
8528 | If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly] |
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |