50 ideas
| 23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
| 23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
| 15716 | If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence [Hilbert] |
| 18844 | You would cripple mathematics if you denied Excluded Middle [Hilbert] |
| 17963 | The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert] |
| 17966 | Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert] |
| 8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend] |
| 12456 | I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
| 12461 | We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert] |
| 13472 | Hilbert aimed to eliminate number from geometry [Hilbert, by Hart,WD] |
| 9633 | No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert] |
| 12460 | We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert] |
| 12462 | Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert] |
| 12455 | The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert] |
| 12457 | There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert] |
| 17967 | To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert] |
| 9546 | Euclid axioms concerns possibilities of construction, but Hilbert's assert the existence of objects [Hilbert, by Chihara] |
| 18742 | Hilbert's formalisation revealed implicit congruence axioms in Euclid [Hilbert, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18217 | Hilbert's geometry is interesting because it captures Euclid without using real numbers [Hilbert, by Field,H] |
| 17965 | The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert] |
| 17964 | Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert] |
| 17697 | The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert] |
| 17698 | Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert] |
| 10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert] |
| 10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| 22293 | Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency [Hilbert, by Potter] |
| 12459 | The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert] |
| 10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| 18112 | Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert] |
| 9636 | My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
| 23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
| 23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
| 23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
| 23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
| 23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
| 23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
| 23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
| 23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
| 23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
| 23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
| 23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
| 23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
| 23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
| 23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
| 23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
| 23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
| 23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
| 17968 | By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert] |