Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Michal Walicki and George Engelbretsen

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34 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Post proved the consistency of propositional logic in 1921 [Walicki]
Propositional language can only relate statements as the same or as different [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Boolean connectives are interpreted as functions on the set {1,0} [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The empty set is useful for defining sets by properties, when the members are not yet known [Walicki]
The empty set avoids having to take special precautions in case members vanish [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
Ordinals play the central role in set theory, providing the model of well-ordering [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
To determine the patterns in logic, one must identify its 'building blocks' [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A 'model' of a theory specifies interpreting a language in a domain to make all theorems true [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
The L-S Theorem says no theory (even of reals) says more than a natural number theory [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
A compact axiomatisation makes it possible to understand a field as a whole [Walicki]
Axiomatic systems are purely syntactic, and do not presuppose any interpretation [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinals are transitive sets of transitive sets; or transitive sets totally ordered by inclusion [Walicki]
Ordinals are the empty set, union with the singleton, and any arbitrary union of ordinals [Walicki]
The union of finite ordinals is the first 'limit ordinal'; 2ω is the second... [Walicki]
Two infinite ordinals can represent a single infinite cardinal [Walicki]
Members of ordinals are ordinals, and also subsets of ordinals [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
In non-Euclidean geometry, all Euclidean theorems are valid that avoid the fifth postulate [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Inductive proof depends on the choice of the ordering [Walicki]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Scotus based modality on semantic consistency, instead of on what the future could allow [Walicki]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]