Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Nancy Cartwright and Michael Bratman

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23 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
16185 Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
17503 Theories can never represent accurately, because their components are abstract [Cartwright,N, by Portides]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
16182 Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
16184 An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16167 Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N]
16169 Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N]
16176 Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N]
16177 I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N]
16180 You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N]
16171 The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
16183 In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20034 Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20033 Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
20026 Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20032 Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
16175 A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
6781 There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird]
16166 Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
16179 Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16170 To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N]
16181 Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N]
16178 There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N]