151 ideas
| 22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
| 22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
| 22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
| 16841 | Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton] |
| 16854 | Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton] |
| 22462 | We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot] |
| 16814 | Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton] |
| 22449 | When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot] |
| 16825 | How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton] |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 16851 | The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton] |
| 16799 | Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton] |
| 16798 | We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton] |
| 16856 | It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton] |
| 16857 | Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton] |
| 16827 | If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton] |
| 16804 | Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton] |
| 16823 | Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton] |
| 16800 | An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton] |
| 16858 | We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton] |
| 16832 | If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton] |
| 16836 | My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton] |
| 16831 | A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton] |
| 16833 | We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton] |
| 16834 | To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton] |
| 16802 | Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton] |
| 16803 | Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton] |
| 16801 | A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton] |
| 16837 | Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton] |
| 16839 | Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton] |
| 16850 | Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton] |
| 16807 | An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton] |
| 16808 | An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton] |
| 16806 | An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton] |
| 16822 | Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton] |
| 16816 | In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton] |
| 16826 | With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton] |
| 16811 | An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton] |
| 16810 | Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton] |
| 16829 | We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton] |
| 16809 | Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton] |
| 16812 | An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton] |
| 16846 | A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton] |
| 16813 | To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton] |
| 16815 | Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton] |
| 16849 | Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton] |
| 16848 | Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton] |
| 16842 | We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton] |
| 16840 | To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton] |
| 16824 | Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton] |
| 16817 | Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton] |
| 16818 | The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton] |
| 16819 | IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton] |
| 16820 | Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton] |
| 16828 | IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton] |
| 16844 | A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton] |
| 16853 | We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton] |
| 16821 | Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton] |
| 16838 | Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton] |
| 16855 | The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton] |
| 16852 | Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton] |
| 22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
| 23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
| 23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
| 22480 | Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot] |
| 23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
| 22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
| 22393 | I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot] |
| 23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
| 22481 | There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG] |
| 22482 | I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot] |
| 22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
| 22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
| 22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
| 22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
| 22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
| 22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
| 22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
| 22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
| 4692 | It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot] |
| 4694 | Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot] |
| 22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
| 22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
| 23683 | Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
| 22451 | All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot] |
| 22485 | Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot] |
| 22474 | Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot] |
| 23684 | Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23690 | We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
| 23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
| 23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
| 23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 22477 | Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot] |
| 22486 | The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot] |
| 23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
| 22375 | Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot] |
| 22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
| 22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
| 23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
| 22378 | We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot] |
| 22487 | Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot] |
| 22377 | Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot] |
| 22376 | Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot] |
| 22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
| 23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
| 22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
| 22452 | Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot] |
| 23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
| 23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |
| 22381 | Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot] |
| 22379 | The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot] |
| 22458 | Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot] |
| 22460 | Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot] |
| 22461 | Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot] |
| 22464 | The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot] |
| 22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
| 22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
| 23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
| 22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
| 22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
| 22402 | Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot] |
| 23145 | Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver] |
| 22401 | Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot] |
| 22398 | Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot] |
| 22478 | The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot] |
| 23692 | Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot] |
| 22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
| 22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
| 22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
| 22456 | Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot] |
| 22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
| 22403 | Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot] |
| 22472 | The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot] |
| 22479 | Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot] |
| 22400 | Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot] |
| 22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
| 22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
| 22395 | Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot] |
| 22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
| 22463 | Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot] |
| 22459 | For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot] |
| 22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
| 4693 | The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot] |
| 22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
| 22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |
| 22380 | Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot] |
| 16847 | Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton] |