108 ideas
15390 | Metaphysics attempts to give an account of everything, in terms of categories and principles [Simons] |
12865 | Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons] |
9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette] |
7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
12815 | Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons] |
12819 | A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons] |
12832 | Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons] |
12834 | Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons] |
12827 | Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons] |
12828 | General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons] |
12822 | Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons] |
12823 | Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons] |
12824 | Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons] |
12825 | Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons] |
12826 | Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons] |
12829 | General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons] |
12830 | Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons] |
12831 | Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons] |
12844 | Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons] |
12816 | Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons] |
12821 | The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons] |
18847 | Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons] |
12813 | Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons] |
12846 | A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons] |
12861 | 'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons] |
12848 | The same members may form two groups [Simons] |
9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette] |
7681 | Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette] |
9463 | Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette] |
7682 | Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette] |
12876 | Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons] |
7697 | On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette] |
9465 | Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette] |
9466 | Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette] |
12845 | Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons] |
9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette] |
9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette] |
7701 | Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette] |
7707 | To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette] |
7692 | Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette] |
7687 | Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette] |
12838 | Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons] |
12842 | There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons] |
12841 | I don't believe in processes [Simons] |
12836 | Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons] |
8979 | Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons] |
8981 | Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons] |
12880 | Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons] |
12881 | A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons] |
12883 | Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons] |
12882 | A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons] |
12840 | I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons] |
8973 | Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons] |
12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
7679 | Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette] |
7678 | Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette] |
7683 | Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette] |
7684 | Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette] |
7703 | If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette] |
18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
7685 | An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette] |
7699 | Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette] |
12850 | To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons] |
12860 | Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons] |
12886 | A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons] |
12835 | Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons] |
12857 | Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons] |
12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |
12866 | Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons] |
12867 | A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons] |
12864 | We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons] |
12814 | Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons] |
12817 | 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons] |
12833 | If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons] |
12849 | Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons] |
12877 | Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons] |
12888 | The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons] |
12871 | Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons] |
12870 | We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons] |
12873 | Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons] |
12874 | An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons] |
12837 | Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons] |
12856 | Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons] |
12885 | Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons] |
12854 | An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons] |
12855 | The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons] |
12872 | The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons] |
7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
12889 | The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
7704 | Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette] |
18883 | Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum [Simons] |
18884 | Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more [Simons] |
9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
7702 | The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette] |
12843 | With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons] |
12875 | One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons] |