36 ideas
14703 | Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter] |
14714 | Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter] |
14704 | 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
14706 | Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter] |
14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |
14717 | Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter] |
14720 | Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter] |
14695 | Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter] |
14696 | Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter] |
14697 | 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter] |
14698 | Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter] |
14699 | Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter] |
14709 | Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter] |
14719 | In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter] |
14701 | Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter] |
14702 | If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter] |
14705 | Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter] |
14715 | 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter] |
14716 | 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter] |
20289 | Ethics is universalisable - it must involve an impartial and universal view of things [Singer] |
20286 | Following an inner voice for morality is irresponsible in a rational agent [Singer] |
20282 | The sanctity of a human life depends either on being of our species, or on being a person [Singer] |
20278 | 'Marginal utility' says something is more useful if it is in short supply [Singer] |
20281 | Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me? [Singer] |
20276 | Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer] |
20290 | Psychopaths may just be bored, because they cannot participate in normal emotional life [Singer] |
20288 | You can't condemn violent revolution without assessing the evils it prevents [Singer] |
21997 | In Marxism the state will be superseded [Singer] |
20287 | If 49% of the population can be wrong, so can 51% [Singer] |
21993 | Materialist history says we are subject to incomprehensible forces [Singer] |
20277 | Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer] |
20279 | Equality of opportunity unfairly rewards those lucky enough to have great ability [Singer] |
20285 | If a right entails having the relevant desire, many creatures might have no right to life [Singer] |
20284 | Why should a potential person have the rights of an actual person? [Singer] |
20283 | Killing a chimp is worse than killing a human too defective to be a person [Singer] |