Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Richard Wollheim and Barbara Vetter

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60 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter]
We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter]
It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter]
All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter]
Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter]
Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter]
A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter]
Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter]
Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter]
There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter]
Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim]
A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim]
It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim]
The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim]
The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim]
The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim]
A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain [Vetter]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter]