34 ideas
15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
20339 | Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim] |
14590 | If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne] |
15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
14591 | Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne] |
8970 | Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne] |
14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20338 | We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim] |
20342 | Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim] |
20343 | A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim] |
20348 | A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim] |
20347 | If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim] |
20345 | Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim] |
20331 | It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim] |
20336 | Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim] |
20337 | The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim] |
20333 | If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim] |
20334 | The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim] |
20335 | The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim] |
20340 | A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim] |
20341 | An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim] |
20332 | A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim] |
15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |
14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |