Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Roger Scruton and John Locke

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388 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton]
The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton]
Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton]
Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away [Scruton]
Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive [Scruton]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Opposition to reason is mad [Locke]
Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question
We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke]
It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke]
If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke]
Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existences can only be known by experience [Locke]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke]
If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke]
Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke]
We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
All things that exist are particulars [Locke]
Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke]
Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke]
Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke]
We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke]
The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke]
Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley]
You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke]
Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke]
Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke]
If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke]
Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi]
It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke]
We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle]
'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke]
In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke]
To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke]
Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]
Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke]
Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke]
A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke]
The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley]
We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke]
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke]
General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke]
If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke]
In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley]
If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke]
A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke]
Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke]
The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke]
The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke]
We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke]
Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley]
Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton]
Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke]
Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke]
In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P]
I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil]
Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton]
If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke]
The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke]
Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H]
Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke]
The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke]
The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke]
General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton]
Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke]
'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke]
My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke]
Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke]
Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke]
Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke]
Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke]
Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke]
If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke]
If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke]
On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke]
Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke]
Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke]
Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke]
No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke]
Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke]
If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke]
If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke]
Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]
Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
Nothing about me is essential [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke]
A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke]
We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke]
Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke]
The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke]
Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton]
Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke]
Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke]
Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton]
Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton]
Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton]
The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton]
Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton]
Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton]
Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton]
Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton]
If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke]
Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke]
We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton]
That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton]
Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton]
Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton]
Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke]
We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality
There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke]
The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke]
There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke]
Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton]
The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton]
A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke]
If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke]
A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke]
The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke]
You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke]
Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke]
Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke]
People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke]
Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke]
Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke]
If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton]
So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke]
The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke]
A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke]
Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
All value depends on the labour involved [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke]
There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke]
Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin]
Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke]
A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke]
If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke]
Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke]
Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke]
Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke]
It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke]
Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke]
Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke]
Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton]
Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton]
Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton]
An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton]
I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton]
Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton]
We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton]
Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton]
Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton]
Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton]
We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton]
Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton]
Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton]
Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P]
The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke]
We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke]
Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P]
An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke]