Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Tyler Burge and Robert Merrihew Adams

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28 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
13479 Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
8132 We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17622 We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
16901 The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
9159 You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
16902 Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14508 A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
14511 There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]
16463 Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
12031 Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
12034 If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
14510 Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
16455 Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14507 Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
11964 Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16451 Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
11901 Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
14512 Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
16892 Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
9382 Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
8126 Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
8127 Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
8129 Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
8131 Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
3115 Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
12032 Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
14349 If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]