12 ideas
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |
| 20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
| 20881 | The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette] |
| 20886 | Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette] |
| 20880 | Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette] |
| 20879 | Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette] |