13 ideas
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
22717 | Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone] |
22718 | Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone] |
22719 | The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone] |
22720 | Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone] |
22721 | The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone] |
22722 | TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone] |
22723 | Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone] |