64 ideas
20186 | Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski] |
19694 | Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb] |
20221 | Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski] |
20220 | Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski] |
13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
20188 | Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski] |
20223 | Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski] |
20217 | Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski] |
20191 | Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski] |
20222 | Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski] |
20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
20194 | Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski] |
20210 | A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski] |
20206 | Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski] |
20208 | We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski] |
20215 | A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski] |
20187 | Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
14366 | An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens] |
13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
17093 | Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon] |
17492 | Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon] |
13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
16557 | Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
20218 | The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski] |
20205 | The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski] |
20202 | Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski] |
20216 | Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski] |
20193 | Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski] |
20199 | Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski] |
20196 | Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski] |
20200 | A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski] |
20201 | Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG] |
20203 | Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski] |
20207 | Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski] |
20214 | Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski] |
20213 | We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski] |
20209 | For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski] |
20197 | The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski] |
8412 | A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon] |
8413 | Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon] |
8411 | Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon] |
4784 | Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos] |
8409 | Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science [Salmon] |