19 ideas
21829 | Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars] |
8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
6550 | Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars] |
8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |