215 ideas
5988 | Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár] |
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
1496 | The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle] |
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
15547 | Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
14874 | Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche] |
6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
4032 | The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong] |
17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
18892 | Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn] |
12019 | McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
15542 | All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
4253 | Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong] |
6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
3185 | Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn] |
22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
1495 | Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius] |
405 | The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander] |
13222 | The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander] |
404 | Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander] |
17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
5492 | How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
1746 | The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius] |
6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |