458 ideas
| 7504 | Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault] |
| 3600 | Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes] |
| 3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
| 14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
| 24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
| 3601 | Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes] |
| 3602 | Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes] |
| 9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
| 14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
| 15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
| 21962 | Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science [Descartes] |
| 17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
| 15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
| 11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
| 24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
| 9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
| 10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
| 3653 | My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics [Descartes] |
| 1569 | Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
| 3603 | Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG] |
| 2248 | Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes] |
| 24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
| 2857 | Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
| 12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
| 11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
| 14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
| 14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
| 11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
| 11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
| 2290 | Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes] |
| 3612 | Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes] |
| 3641 | It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 4524 | Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 3659 | I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth [Descartes] |
| 4736 | Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes] |
| 3610 | Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes] |
| 2266 | My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes] |
| 4301 | Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| 17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
| 15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
| 17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
| 4298 | All items of possible human knowledge are interconnected, and can be reached by inference [Descartes] |
| 9560 | S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense [Fine,K] |
| 14263 | Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K] |
| 10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
| 13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
| 10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
| 23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
| 17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
| 10054 | Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes] |
| 9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
| 12220 | Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K] |
| 11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
| 15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
| 15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
| 15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
| 15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
| 15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
| 15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
| 9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
| 14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
| 15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
| 11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
| 12222 | Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K] |
| 10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
| 10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
| 23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
| 11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
| 9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
| 2252 | Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes] |
| 2430 | I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes] |
| 10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
| 13445 | Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD] |
| 10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
| 10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
| 24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
| 24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
| 12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
| 12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
| 12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
| 21963 | It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes] |
| 10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
| 9224 | Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K] |
| 9222 | The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction [Fine,K] |
| 9223 | My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K] |
| 12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
| 15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
| 14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
| 24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
| 10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
| 10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
| 10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
| 12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
| 12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
| 12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
| 15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
| 15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
| 14262 | Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K] |
| 17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
| 17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
| 17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
| 17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
| 17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
| 17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
| 17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
| 17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
| 14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
| 17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
| 17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
| 15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
| 15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
| 15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
| 15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
| 14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
| 14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
| 14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
| 14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
| 11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
| 3644 | Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes] |
| 9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
| 10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
| 12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
| 15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
| 15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
| 15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
| 15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
| 9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
| 15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
| 17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
| 15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
| 23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
| 23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
| 23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
| 23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
| 9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
| 9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
| 9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
| 9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
| 9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
| 23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
| 9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
| 9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
| 12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
| 14217 | The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K] |
| 14216 | The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K] |
| 14218 | A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K] |
| 14220 | Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K] |
| 14219 | Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K] |
| 16635 | Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| 16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
| 16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
| 5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
| 5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
| 9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
| 15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
| 2297 | If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes] |
| 14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
| 13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
| 3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
| 16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
| 5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
| 3628 | Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 16774 | Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| 9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
| 23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
| 13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
| 14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
| 14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
| 16631 | If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes] |
| 13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
| 13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
| 13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
| 13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
| 13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
| 11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
| 14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
| 11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
| 14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
| 11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
| 17865 | Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog] |
| 11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
| 14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
| 11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
| 15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
| 11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
| 11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
| 11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
| 11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
| 9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
| 10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
| 16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
| 10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
| 15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
| 12251 | Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes] |
| 12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
| 12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
| 12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
| 18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
| 12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
| 17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
| 11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
| 15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
| 15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
| 15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
| 15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
| 9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
| 9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
| 15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
| 9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
| 9212 | Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K] |
| 17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
| 14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
| 9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
| 17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
| 24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
| 11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
| 11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
| 11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
| 15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
| 2301 | We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes] |
| 3642 | Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
| 15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
| 15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
| 3605 | We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes] |
| 20190 | Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski] |
| 1583 | In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 1585 | Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
| 9807 | In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time [Descartes] |
| 1582 | Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 3657 | Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty [Descartes] |
| 2256 | Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes] |
| 3622 | The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes] |
| 5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
| 2260 | If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes] |
| 24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
| 24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
| 3607 | In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes] |
| 6929 | Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 3849 | "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes] |
| 2258 | I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes] |
| 2259 | "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes] |
| 3160 | The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes] |
| 3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
| 6914 | Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 4641 | In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| 5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
| 1117 | The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes] |
| 5588 | The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes] |
| 13923 | Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe] |
| 6930 | Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes] |
| 2873 | Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5360 | The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes] |
| 2870 | 'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5188 | A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes] |
| 3623 | The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| 3624 | That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 3120 | Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes] |
| 4526 | The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5579 | How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5580 | My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5587 | We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes] |
| 1369 | It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes] |
| 2261 | My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes] |
| 2257 | I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes] |
| 24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
| 24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
| 3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
| 2279 | A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes] |
| 5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
| 2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
| 3617 | I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes] |
| 6490 | For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H] |
| 22593 | Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes] |
| 15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
| 7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
| 2295 | Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes] |
| 2265 | We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes] |
| 3611 | Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes] |
| 3627 | Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2264 | We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes] |
| 2263 | The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes] |
| 24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
| 24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
| 3606 | I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes] |
| 2247 | To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes] |
| 2255 | Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes] |
| 5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
| 9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
| 2251 | Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes] |
| 6347 | Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes] |
| 3620 | We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| 3619 | The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 3621 | Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes] |
| 2249 | It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes] |
| 2296 | If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes] |
| 2253 | God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes] |
| 2254 | To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes] |
| 2305 | Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes] |
| 3604 | When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes] |
| 2294 | I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes] |
| 3618 | Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes] |
| 17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
| 17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
| 15282 | Facts should be deducible from the theory and initial conditions, and prefer the simpler theory [Osiander, by Harré/Madden] |
| 15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
| 15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 3850 | We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes] |
| 2302 | Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes] |
| 3615 | Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes] |
| 24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
| 5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
| 16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
| 3151 | Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes] |
| 24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
| 21800 | Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid] |
| 1399 | Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes] |
| 9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |
| 1400 | Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes] |
| 3609 | I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes] |
| 23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
| 1401 | Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes] |
| 2299 | I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes] |
| 6907 | For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
| 2283 | Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes] |
| 5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
| 3789 | The more reasons that compel me, the freer I am [Descartes] |
| 2282 | My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes] |
| 4310 | We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes] |
| 24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
| 3608 | I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes] |
| 3613 | Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes] |
| 2276 | The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes] |
| 2298 | Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes] |
| 3423 | Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim] |
| 2303 | The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes] |
| 5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
| 3616 | The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes] |
| 6153 | Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes] |
| 6553 | Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan] |
| 3654 | The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG] |
| 3625 | The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 2552 | Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes] |
| 4305 | Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes] |
| 4861 | Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 6540 | Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes] |
| 7733 | Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes] |
| 5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
| 17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
| 3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
| 5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
| 4015 | For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 4313 | Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham] |
| 23989 | There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie] |
| 4017 | Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 2284 | I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes] |
| 5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
| 15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
| 3614 | A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes] |
| 15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
| 5685 | True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes] |
| 3629 | All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
| 2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
| 2286 | The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes] |
| 3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
| 2285 | I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes] |
| 2273 | The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes] |
| 9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
| 9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
| 10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
| 10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
| 9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
| 10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
| 10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
| 10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
| 10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
| 15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
| 15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
| 15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
| 15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
| 15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
| 15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
| 14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
| 14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
| 14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
| 9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
| 15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |
| 15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
| 11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
| 11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
| 14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |
| 20037 | Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes] |
| 5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
| 5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
| 16763 | We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes] |
| 1581 | Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes] |
| 4016 | Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
| 19676 | Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux] |
| 15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
| 2280 | Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes] |
| 12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
| 24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |
| 14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
| 16569 | The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes] |
| 6518 | Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes] |
| 16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |
| 16684 | Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes] |
| 2272 | There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes] |
| 23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |
| 16686 | God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes] |
| 9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 20964 | Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Descartes, by Papineau] |
| 15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
| 15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
| 15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
| 2269 | God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes] |
| 2289 | Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes] |
| 2275 | It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes] |
| 3637 | Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes] |
| 2287 | Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes] |
| 3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
| 2268 | One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes] |
| 2274 | The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes] |
| 3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |
| 2288 | I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes] |
| 3638 | Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 3632 | We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 3633 | We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 5036 | Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| 3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |
| 16712 | Atheism is an atrocious and intolerable crime in any country [Descartes] |
| 3660 | Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible [Descartes] |
| 16772 | An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| 3652 | I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body [Descartes] |
| 3636 | God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2278 | Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes] |
| 2277 | Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes] |
| 2281 | If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes] |