Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Andrew Shorten, Roderick Chisholm and Stephen Boulter

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Liberal Nationalism says welfare states and democracy needed a shared sense of nationality [Shorten]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm]
A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm]
I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm]
Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm]
A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are? [Chisholm]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm]
If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm]
So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm]
If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm]
Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm]
Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm]
Utilitarians conflate acts and omissions; causing to drown and failing to save are the same [Shorten]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
There are eight different ways in which groups of people can be oppressed [Shorten, by PG]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Constitutional Patriotism unites around political values (rather than national identity) [Shorten]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is a method of selection, or it involves participation, or it concerns public discussion [Shorten]
Some say democracy is intrinsically valuable, others that it delivers good outcomes [Shorten]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Representative should be either obedient, or sensible, or typical [Shorten]
There is 'mirror representation' when the institution statistically reflects the population [Shorten]
In a changed situation a Mandated Representative can't keep promises and fight for constituents [Shorten]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberal citizens have a moral requirement to respect freedom and equality [Shorten]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Maybe the rational autonomous liberal individual is merely the result of domination [Shorten]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Liberal equality concerns rights, and liberal freedom concerns choice of ends [Shorten]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
Liberal Nationalism encourages the promotion of nationalistic values [Shorten]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberalism should not make assumptions such as the value of choosing your own life plan [Shorten]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Liberals treat individuals as mutual strangers, rather than as social beings [Shorten]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
Liberal Nationalism is more communitarian, and Constitutional Patriotism more cosmopolitan [Shorten]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
Religious toleration has been institutionalised by the separation of church and state [Shorten]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm]