Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anon (Dan), ��ystein Linnebo and Michel de Montaigne

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Montaigne was the founding father of liberalism [Montaigne, by Gopnik]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo]
A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo]
To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo]
Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo]
'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo]
'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo]
In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Rules and duties are based on the will, as that is all we control [Montaigne]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Apart from the fear, dying is an easy duty [Montaigne]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We must fight fiercely to hang on to the few pleasures which survive into old age [Montaigne]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Resurrection developed in Judaism as a response to martyrdoms, in about 160 BCE [Anon (Dan), by Watson]