Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anon (Dham), Alain Badiou and Frank Jackson

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90 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy aims to reveal the grandeur of mathematics [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
In mathematics, if a problem can be formulated, it will eventually be solved [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou]
There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou]
Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Mathematics shows that thinking is not confined to the finite [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou]
Mathematics inscribes being as such [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou]
The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
It is of the essence of being to appear [Badiou]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington]
There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington]
Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
(A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson]
Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson]
Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
All great poetry is engaged in rivalry with mathematics [Badiou]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou]