80 ideas
7893 | Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)] |
2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
7898 | The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)] |
5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
7260 | If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J] |
7261 | Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J] |
7262 | Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J] |
7265 | Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J] |
18681 | The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi] |
7894 | Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)] |
7899 | Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)] |
7896 | The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)] |
7897 | The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)] |
7895 | Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)] |
7900 | Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)] |