Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anon (Dham), Michael Smith and Isaiah Berlin

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
The great moments are the death of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Romanticism [Berlin, by Watson]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Romanticism is the greatest change in the consciousness of the West [Berlin]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that virtue consists ultimately in knowledge [Berlin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
If we are essentially free wills, authenticity and sincerity are the highest virtues [Berlin]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
The Greeks have no notion of obligation or duty [Berlin]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Central to existentialism is the romantic idea that there is nothing to lean on [Berlin]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Berlin distinguishes 'negative' and 'positive' liberty, and rejects the latter [Berlin, by Swift]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Judaism and Christianity views are based on paternal, family and tribal relations [Berlin]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)]