Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anon (Dham), Roderick Chisholm and Jeremy Bentham

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65 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm]
A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm]
I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm]
Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm]
A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are? [Chisholm]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm]
If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm]
So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm]
Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm]
If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm]
Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]
Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham]
The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham]
The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)]