Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anon (Ecc), Ernest Sosa and Amie L. Thomasson

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
In much wisdom is much grief [Anon (Ecc)]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Laughter is mad; of mirth, what doeth it? [Anon (Ecc)]
Sorrow is better than laughter [Anon (Ecc)]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa]
We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa]
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa]
A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
All is vanity, saith the Preacher [Anon (Ecc)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Books are endless, and study is wearisome [Anon (Ecc)]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa]
Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa]