Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anon (Lev), Michael Strevens and David Kaplan

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
11970 Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
11989 For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
11969 Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11971 The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11973 Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
11972 Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11990 'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
9668 'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
11991 If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
14365 Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens]
14368 We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens]
14369 Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
11967 Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14080 Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14894 Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
14700 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
19941 Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself [Anon (Leviticus)]