152 ideas
| 19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
| 19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
| 19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
| 19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
| 19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
| 6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
| 3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
| 19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
| 3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
| 19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
| 12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
| 12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
| 6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
| 3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
| 19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
| 10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
| 16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
| 19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
| 19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
| 19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
| 19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
| 16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
| 15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
| 19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
| 10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
| 13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
| 19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
| 19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
| 19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
| 19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
| 19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
| 15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
| 18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
| 15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
| 19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
| 19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
| 19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
| 19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
| 19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
| 2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
| 10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
| 10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
| 10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
| 16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
| 17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
| 10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
| 16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
| 19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
| 19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
| 19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
| 19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
| 12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
| 3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
| 10152 | Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski] |
| 10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
| 13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
| 3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
| 18812 | Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
| 10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
| 10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
| 13344 | X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X [Tarski] |
| 3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
| 19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
| 18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
| 3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
| 3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
| 3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
| 12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
| 10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
| 18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
| 19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
| 13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
| 13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
| 13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
| 13343 | A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions [Tarski] |
| 16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
| 8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
| 19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
| 10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
| 12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
| 10151 | I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski] |
| 19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
| 19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
| 19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
| 3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
| 3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
| 3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
| 3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
| 3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
| 3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
| 6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
| 19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
| 19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
| 3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
| 8800 | If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa] |
| 6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
| 3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
| 6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
| 6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
| 17060 | Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Harman, by Smart] |
| 12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
| 12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| 12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
| 3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| 3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
| 6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
| 3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
| 12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
| 3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
| 12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
| 12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
| 12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
| 12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
| 12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
| 3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
| 3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
| 3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
| 3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
| 13345 | Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them [Tarski] |
| 3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
| 12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
| 12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
| 3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
| 20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
| 5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
| 5122 | Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman] |
| 5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
| 5123 | Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman] |
| 5124 | If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman] |
| 5125 | Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman] |
| 7506 | God made man in his own image [Anon (Tor)] |
| 16782 | The names of all the types of creature were given forever by Adam [Anon (Tor)] |
| 4013 | And God saw the light, that it was good [Anon (Tor)] |